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DOES EVIDENCE LAW MATTER IN CRIMINAL
SUPPRESSION HEARINGS?
Elizabeth Phillips Marsh*
When the topic of this Symposium was first posed to me, my imme-
diate response was that of course the law of evidence matters! Look at all
of the efforts expended by judges, practicing attorneys, legislators, law
students and legal scholars in the field. Many of us spend precious mo-
ments of our lives worrying through the thickets of conditional rele-
vancy, Bayesian probability theory and the like. How could the law of
evidence not matter, especially if one takes as a starting premise that this
body of doctrine is crucial to the sane and civilized resolution of disputes
in the quixotic search for the truth?1
On further reflection, however, my response changed as it was tem-
pered by the observation that yes, the rules matter, but maybe not for the
reasons that appear at first blush. The answer to the question of whether
evidence law matters turns, at least in part, on the perspective of the
person asking the question. It also hinges on the type of proceeding to
which the rules are being applied. Finally, the importance of evidence
law, I suspect, bears an inverse proportion to the complexity of any re-
lated questions of admissibility of evidence under doctrines other than
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Bridgeport School of Law; A.B. 1974,
Harvard University (Radcliffe College); J.D., 1977, New York University School of Law. Pro-
fessor Marsh served as an Assistant District Attorney of New York County in the Office of
Robert M. Morgenthau, 1977-1983.
1. The trial is often characterized as a search for the truth. This goal has been deemed a
core value in the American legal system. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1247,
1257 (1991) (White, J., dissenting in Part III of the opinion) ("The search for truth is indeed
central to our system of justice .... ) However, perhaps this characterization expresses more
an ideal than a reality. A consensus is easily reached that "a trial or hearing is a dispute
resolution mechanism." RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES 3 (3d ed.
1991).
Commentators are not in agreement, however, that the trial system, in fact, is designed to
seek the truth. A number of writers have expressed skepticism about this notion. See, e.g., J.
Alexander Tanford, A Political-choice Approach to Limiting Prejudicial Evidence, 64 IND. L.J.
831, 850 (1989).
This vision of evidence (that it is driven by only a single dominant principle of accu-
rate decision making) is inconsistent with the general theory of American litigation.
That theory holds that trials are shaped by at least two competing principles: verdict
accuracy and adversariness. The more fundamental characteristic of our trial system
is in fact its adversarial structure, not its commitment to accurate results.
Id. at 849-50 (citations omitted).
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the rules of evidence, such as constitutionally-based exclusionary rules.2
Thus, in this Essay I examine pretrial hearings to suppress evidence in
criminal cases because of alleged constitutional violations' in an effort to
shed light on the question of whether evidence law matters and if so, to
whom.
I. HEARINGS ON MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS: THE BASIC FORMAT
In criminal cases defendants often move to suppress evidence on the
basis of an alleged constitutional violation.' Commonly, defendants al-
2. For example, evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment warrant require-
ment must be suppressed. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961). Statements taken in
violation of a criminal defendant's Fifth Amendment rights should be suppressed. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Additionally, statements made involuntarily have no place
in the adjudicatory trial phase. See, eg., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986);
Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109-10 (1986); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286-87
(1936). Moreover, statements by a criminal defendant taken in violation of his or her right to
counsel should be suppressed. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 400-01 (1977); Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964). Testimony concerning an eyewitness identification of
the defendant must be suppressed when the identification was obtained in violation of defend-
ant's right to an attorney. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967). Testimony concerning an eyewitness identification of the
defendant must also be suppressed when the identification procedure violated due process.
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112-13 (1977); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02
(1967).
3. The focus of this Essay is solely upon suppression for alleged constitutional violations.
Note, however, that suppression may be sought on other grounds as well. For example, the
United States Supreme Court may exercise a supervisory authority over lower federal courts.
See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943) (holding scope of United States
Supreme Court's reviewing power not limited to determining constitutional validity but in-
cludes "establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence"). Some
defendants have alleged ethical violations as a basis for the suppression of evidence. E.g.,
United States v. Hammad, 678 F. Supp. 397, 400-01 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir.
1988). Suppression may be based on federal statutory grounds, see Grau v. United States, 287
U.S. 124, 128 (1932), overruled by Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), on other
grounds, or on state grounds, see EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 166, at
450-55 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984).
4. In federal courts, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 governs motions to suppress
evidence. Rule 12 provides, in pertinent part:
(b) PRETRIAL MOTIONS. Any defense, objection, or request which is capable of
determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by
motion. Motions may be written or oral at the discretion of the judge. The following
must be raised prior to trial:
( 3) Motions to suppress evidence; ....
(e) RULING ON MOTION. A motion made before trial shall be determined
before trial unless the court, for good cause, orders that it be deferred for determina-
tion at the trial of the general issue or until after verdict, but no such determination
shall be deferred if a party's right to appeal is adversely affected. Where factual
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lege violations of their Fourth,' Fifth' or Sixth Amendment7 rights. As-
suming that the movant has standing' and has made a sufficient
preliminary showing,9 the trial judge will order that a hearing be held to
adjudicate the suppression issue(s).
Hearings on the admissibility of confessions must be held outside
the presence of the jury10 and virtually all hearings on motions to sup-
press based on other grounds are decided by a judge alone.'1 The ration-
ale for this format is obvious. If the evidence in question should be
suppressed, it would be improper for a jury to hear the evidence during
the preliminary determination. Once a jury has heard evidence that was
issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its essential findings
on the record.
(i) PRODUCTION OF STATEMENTS AT SUPPRESSION HEARING. Except as
herein provided, rule 26.2 [Production of Statements of Witnesses] shall apply at a
hearing on a motion to suppress evidence under subdivision (b)(3) of this rule. For
purposes of this subdivision, a law enforcement officer shall be deemed a witness
called by the government, and upon a claim of privilege the court shall excise the
portions of the statement containing privileged matter.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.
5. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6. In pertinent part, the Fifth Amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeop-
ardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law ....
U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
7. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed.., and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for ob-
taining Witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
8. The standing requirement is common to all constitutional challenges. There are some
special nuances, however, in the criminal procedure arena, especially in cases in which Fourth
Amendment violations are alleged. See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 11.3 (2d ed. 1987).
9. Generally, defense counsel must allege the grounds upon which the motion to suppress
is based. In addition, many jurisdictions require facts to support the allegations. See, e.g., 4
id. § 11.2, at 213-17.
10. FED. R. EvID. 104(c); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
11. The question arises, however, whether the jury will confront similar issues at trial. See
infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
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later suppressed, it would be difficult to ascertain whether or not the jury
considered it in its adjudication on the merits, even in the face of the
most punctilious judicial instructions to disregard the evidence. It would
be like asking the jury not to think of a pink elephant when reaching its
decision.2
In addition, by holding the hearing outside the presence of the jury,
the defendant is given an option to testify as to the conditions governing
admissibility without taking the stand in the case-in-chief.13
II. WHAT EVIDENTIARY RULES APPLY AT A HEARING ON A
MOTION TO SUPPRESS? AND SHOULD THE STANDARD
CHANGE?
The extent to which the rules of evidence apply to hearings on mo-
tions to suppress is not as straightforward as one might think. Before we
ask whether the law of evidence matters, it might be wise to take at least
a moment to ask what is the law of evidence? The law of evidence has
been classically defined as "the system of rules and standards by which
the admission of proof at the trial of a lawsuit is regulated."14 Of course,
12. When a defendant requests a bench trial, the trial judge will first handle the hearing on
the motion to suppress, then adjudicate guilt or innocence. Presumably, a judge would be
better able than a jury to disregard evidence revealed at the hearing on the motion to suppress,
but excluded at the trial. As Professor Patton has noted, however, not all commentators agree
that judges are able to disregard prejudicial (or unreliable) evidence. See William W. Patton,
Evolution in Child Abuse Litigation: The Theoretical Void Where Evidentlary and Procedural
Worlds Collide, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1009, 1012 & n.9 (1992). This situation, however, need
not detain us, since this Essay focuses on the more traditional judge-adjudicated hearing fol-
lowed by a jury-adjudicated trial.
13. FED. R. EVID. 104(c) advisory committee's note. If a defendant exercises the option to
testify, however, there is a cost. While the prosecutor may not introduce the hearing testimony
during the case-in-chief at trial, the prosecutor may use the hearing testimony to impeach the
defendant should that individual choose to testify at trial. See infra text accompanying notes
73-74.
14. CLEARY, supra note 3, § 1, at 1. Codes of evidence have been critiqued from the
feminist perspective as a "body of formal, abstract, complex evidentiary rules" that do not
further the truth-seeking process. See, eg., Kit Kinports, Symposium in Honor of Edward W.
Cleary: Evidence and Procedure for the Future: Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV.
413, 419. For example, Professor Kinports posits that:
Feminist theory would question on several levels the very concept of a code of
evidence-a body of formal, abstract, complex evidentiary rules like the Federal
Rules of Evidence. In place of the current evidence codes, a feminist perspective
would advocate an approach to evidence that was less abstract and more tied to the
context of a particular case, that simplified the rules to make them more accessible to
nonlawyers and therefore less hierarchical, that fostered cooperation rather than
competition between the parties, and that envisioned less formal procedures. At the
same time, a feminist approach would strive to incorporate women's perspectives and
accommodate their needs. Accomplishing the latter goals requires efforts to ensure
that the law of evidence does not explicitly discriminate against women and that
facially neutral rules are not applied in ways detrimental to women. In addition, the
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we are not concerned solely with trials but with any proceeding in which
factual resolutions are at issue. For our immediate purpose, let us focus
on the Federal Rules of Evidence to determine the extent that they gov-
ern in hearings on motions to suppress in federal courts.
The Federal Rules of Evidence govern all proceedings in United
States courts with a number of exceptions.' 5 These exceptions are out-
lined in Rule 1101.16 Clearly the Rules apply to both civil and criminal
cases, 7 but certain aspects of criminal proceedings are specifically ex-
empted from coverage. It is clear that if the Rules apply at all to hear-
evidence rules must reflect not only the views of privileged white men but also the
differing concerns and perspectives of others.
Id. (citations omitted).
15. Federal Rule of Evidence 101 provides: "These rules govern proceedings in the courts
of the United States and before United States magistrates, to the extent and with the excep-
tions stated in rule 1101." FED. R. EvID. 101.
16. Federal Rule of Evidence 1101 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Courts and magistrates. These rules apply to the United States district
courts,... the United States courts of appeals, the United States Claims Court and to
United States magistrates, in the actions, cases, and proceedings and to the extent
hereinafter set forth. The terms "judge" and "court" in these rules include United
States magistrates.
(b) Proceedings generally. These rules apply generally to civil actions and pro-
ceedings, including admiralty and maritime cases, to criminal cases and proceedings,
to contempt proceedings except those in which the court may act similarly, and to
proceedings and cases under title 11, United States Code.
(c) Rule of privilege. The rule with respect to privilege applies at all stages of
all actions, cases, and proceedings.
(d) Rules inapplicable. The rules (other than with respect to privileges) do not
applyin the following situations:
(1) Preliminary questions of fact. The determination of questions of fact pre-
liminary to admissibility of evidence when the issue is to be determined by the court
under rule 104.
(2) Grand jury. Proceedings before grand juries.
(3) Miscellaneous proceedings. Proceedings for extradition or rendition; pre-
liminary examinations in criminal cases; sentencing, or granting or revoking proba-
tion; issuance of warrants for arrest, criminal summonses, and search warrants; and
proceedings with respect to release on bail or otherwise.
(e) Rules applicable in part. In the following proceedings these rules apply to
the extent that matters of evidence are not provided for in the statutes which govern
procedure therein or in other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
statutory authority: the trial of minor and petty offenses by United States magis-
trates; ... prize proceedings in admiralty under sections 7651-7681 of title 10, United
States Code;... habeas corpus under sections 2241-2254 of title 28, United States
Code, motions to vacate, set aside or correct sentence under section 2255 of title 28,
United States Code ....
FED. R. EVID. 1101.
17. FED. R. EVID. 1101(b). In spite of specific situations in which the Rules provide for
differentiated treatment of civil and criminal cases-for example Rules 104(c), 404 and 608-
Rule 1101(b) "contemplates a unitary system of evidence." GLEN WEISSENBERGER, WEIS-
SENBERGER'S FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: RULES, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, COMMEN-
TARY AND AUTHORrrY § 1101.1, at 703 (1987).
It would seem that courts are more willing to apply the rules in civil contexts than crimi-
nal. Thus, it is somewhat anomalous that the rules apply in contexts such as resolution of fee
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ings on motions to suppress, they are-at the very least-dramatically
relaxed. Rule 1101 does not, however, specifically name hearings on mo-
tions to suppress as one of the exclusions from the applicability of the
Rules."8
Should the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to such hearings? Are
there similarities between hearings on motions to suppress on the basis of
alleged constitutional violations and the proceedings that are specifically
exempted from Rule 1101 that would make exclusion desirable as a pol-
icy matter?
First, what is being adjudicated at a hearing on a motion to sup-
press? Although it may be oversimplistic, a review of some of the com-
mon grounds might be useful. When criminal defendants allege a Fourth
Amendment violation seeking to suppress real evidence, claims com-
monly may include the following:19 (1) the police acted to search or seize
in the absence of the requisite probable cause;20 (2) the police lacked a
warrant and none of the recognized warrant exceptions were applica-
disputes, but not to matters that might govern whether or not an individual is incarcerated.
See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 751 F.2d 562, 584, 597 (3d Cir. 1984).
18. The Advisory Committee does acknowledge the need for constitutional adjudication,
but does so by stating that Rule 1101(d) "is not intended as an expression as to when due
process or other constitutional provisions may require an evidentiary hearing." FED. R. EVID.
1101(d) advisory committee's note.
19. For a discussion of exceptions that include instances that are not deemed to implicate
Fourth Amendment interests, see Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83
MICH. L. REv. 1468, 1473 n.21 (1985).
20. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
Vol. 25:987
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ble;2 1 (3) the police had a warrant, but it was defective;22 (4) a Terry2 3
intrusion occurred in the absence of a sufficient articulable suspicion or
the level of police intrusion was not reasonably related to the factors that
precipitated the police action; or (5) consent was lacking.24
If defendants allege a Fifth Amendment violation seeking to sup-
press their own statements, common claims may include: (1) assuming
that the defendant was in custody and subjected to interrogation, the
police failed to give Miranda warnings prior to the statement;25 (2) even
if Miranda warnings were appropriately given, the defendant did not vol-
untarily waive his or her rights;26 or (3) the statements, regardless of
Miranda concerns, were made involuntarily and thus violated due
process.27
When defendants allege a Sixth Amendment violation seeking to
suppress statements by the accused, a denial of a right to counsel at a
critical stage must be established.28  Additionally, Sixth Amendment
21. Agreed-upon exceptions to the warrant requirement would include the automobile ex-
ception, California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798
(1982), the arrest-in-a-public-place exception, United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976),
the search-incident-to-a-valid-arrest exception, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the
plain-view exception, Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990), the hot-pursuit exception,
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), the exigent-circumstances exception, id., the border
search exception, United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985), and the con-
sent exception, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). Some courts would include
stop and frisk as an exception. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). More recently, the Supreme
Court has adopted new doctrines that might be categorized as exceptions, including the inven-
tory exception to the warrant requirement, Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990); Colorado v.
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983), roadblock searches,
Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), searches in which officers rely, in
good faith, on a statute defining police powers which is later found to be unconstitutional,
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987), drug testing, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 567 (1988), and the
doctrine of inevitable discovery, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
See the discussion of these exceptions in Elizabeth P. Marsh, On Rollercoasters, Subma-
rines, and Judicial Shipwrecks: Acoustic Separation and the Good Faith Exception to the Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 1989 U. ILL. L. RV. 941, 959 nn. 110-11.
22. See, eg., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984).
23. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-17, 26-27.
24. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49; see Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2796-98
(1990).
25. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966).
26. Id. at 470.
27. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1251-53 (1991); Colorado v. Connelly, 479
U.S. 157, 162 (1986); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 506-07 (1963).
28. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964). But see Moran v. Burbine, 475
U.S. 412 (1986) (holding pre-arraignment confession of defendant admissible and not in viola-
tion of Sixth Amendment right to counsel where police failed to inform defendant that his
sister bad retained attorney for him, because adversary proceedings had not been commenced,
thus critical stage not established).
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waiver issues may need to be adjudicated.29
Similarly, alternative theories are available to suppress identification
testimony offered against a criminal defendant. If a defendant alleges a
Fifth Amendment violation, a common claim may be that the identifica-
tion procedure was so suggestive that it precluded any reliable identifica-
tion and thus violated due process.30 If a defendant alleges a Sixth
Amendment violation, the defense must allege that the defendant was
denied a right to counsel at a critical stage of the proceeding during
which an identification procedure was conducted."
Although hearings on motions to suppress could conceivably be
considered part of the "preliminary examinations in criminal cases,"
which are exempted from coverage by the Rules of Evidence, 32 it seems
more logical to treat the decision as to whether or not evidence will be
excluded on the basis of a constitutional violation as a preliminary ques-
tion of fact to be determined by the court under Rule 104.13 Under
either treatment, the Federal Rules of Evidence (other than the rules of
privilege) theoretically would not apply.34 Yet it is difficult to imagine
that hearings on motions to suppress would be completely unfettered
from any consideration of the Rules.
The exclusions named in Rule 1101 are all based on particular pol-
icy considerations that warrant exemption from the Federal Rules of Evi-
29. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292-94 (1988).
30. Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 103-04, 114-17 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S.
188, 189-90 (1972).
31. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-90 (1972); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
226-27 (1967).
32. FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3).
33. Federal Rule of Evidence 104 states:
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibil-
ity of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivi-
sion (b). In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except
with respect to privileges.
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of evidence depends
upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to,
the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the
condition.
(c) Hearing of jury. Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in all
cases be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary
matters shall be so conducted when the interests of justice require or, when an ac-
cused is a witness, if he so requests.
(d) Testimony by accused. The accused does not, by testifying upon a prelimi-
nary matter, subject himself to cross-examination as to other issues in the case.
(e) Weight and credibility. This rule does not limit the right of a party to intro-
duce before the jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility.
FED. R. EVID. 104.
34. FED. R. EvID. 1101(d)(1).
(Vol. 25:987
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dence. Generally, the rules do not apply "(1) when a Judge is deciding a
preliminary question of fact-preliminary, that is, to a decision on
whether or not to admit evidence; (2) in a grand jury proceeding and in
preliminary examinations in criminal cases; (3) in probation and sentenc-
ing proceedings; (4) when a warrant is sought; and (5) in bail proceed-
ings."' 35  Thus, the Rules are inapplicable to federal grand jury
proceedings.36 Moreover, certain criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings
such as extradition or rendition proceedings, sentencing or probation rev-
ocation proceedings, bail proceedings and the issuance of warrants for
arrest or to search are excluded from the coverage of the Federal Rules
of Evidence.37 In short, a proceeding is exempt from the Rules when: (1)
the issue is not a final adjudication of guilt but only a preparatory step;38
or (2) the proceeding addresses the consequences39 of a final adjudication
of guilt or innocence rather than the determination itself. In virtually all
of these proceedings, except the grand jury, the judge is the fact finder to
the exclusion of the jury; the standard employed embodies a heavy com-
ponent of judicial discretion; and the decision to be made is rarely out-
come determinative on the merits.
In hearings on motions to suppress, as with most of the proceedings
excluded from the operation of the Rules, the judge is the fact finder.
Presumably, a judge is able to disregard irrelevant or prejudicial evidence
and evidence that would tend to support a relaxation or elimination of
the applicability of the Rules.' The standards for judicial determination
are not purely discretionary, but they certainly include a high degree of
35. 2 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & MICHAEL M. MARTIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
MANUAL 9 (5th ed. 1990) (editorial explanatory comment to Rule 1101).
36. FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(2).
37. FED. R. EVID. I101(d)(3).
38. Thus, the proceedings that precede a criminal trial would be excluded, such as bail
proceedings, see United States v. Vaccaro, 719 F. Supp. 1510, 1514-15 (D. Nev. 1989); extradi-
tion hearings, see Melia v. United States, 667 F.2d 300, 302 (2d Cir. 1981); and grand jury
proceedings, see In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 378-80 (3d Cir. 1990); see also
FED. R. EVID. 1 101(d)(3) (exempting from Rules certain miscellaneous proceedings including
preliminary examinations in criminal cases, issuance of arrest and search warrants, and sen-
tencing hearings).
39. The "consequences" of an adjudication of guilt would include sentencing, see United
States v. Roberts, 881 F.2d 95, 105-07 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Agyemang, 876 F.2d
1264, 1270-71 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Flores, 875 F.2d 1110, 1112-13 (5th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Jarrett, 705 F.2d 198, 205-06 (7th Cir. 1983), probation revocation, see United
States v. Miller, 797 F.2d 336, 340-41 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. McCallum, 677 F.2d
1024, 1026 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Torrez-Flores, 624 F.2d 776, 778-80 (7th Cir.
1980); United States v. Francischine, 512 F.2d 827, 829 (5th Cir. 1975), and parole revocation,
see Downie v. Klincar, 759 F. Supp. 425, 426-28 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
40. See Patton, supra note 12, at 1011. In theory, a proceeding before a judge alone is
more expeditious than one before a jury and the consideration of objections to evidence is
April 1992]
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flexibility premised on factual resolution."g For example, the standard
for probable cause is far from a cut and dried rule. It turns on gauging
the reasonableness of the belief of a reasonably prudent officer.42 Simi-
larly, the voluntariness of a statement43 or of a waiver of constitutional
rights"4 turns on the facts of each individual case. Unlike the situations
specifically exempted from the operation of the Rules, however, a deci-
sion on the motion to suppress is often outcome determinative if it is
adverse to the government. Thus, from the prosecution's viewpoint, if
evidence is suppressed, at worst, the case will be dismissed; at best, valua-
ble evidence will be lost and the defendant will be in an enhanced plea
bargaining position.45
much less time consuming. ROBERT E. KEETON, TRIAL TACTIs AND METHODS § 8.3, at
297-98 (2d ed. 1973).
41. This permits the "legalgap: the idea that, for some questions, there is no legal author-
ity which requires the court to decide the issue one way or another." David P. Leonard, Power
and Responsibility in Evidence Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 937, 940 (1990); see also Charles M.
Yablon, Justifying the Judge's Hunch: An Essay on Discretion, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 231 (1990)
(evaluating and defining reality of judicial discretionary decision-making).
42. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
43. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985):
[T]he admissibility of a confession turns as much on whether the techniques for ex-
tracting the statements, as applied to this suspect, are compatible with a system that
presumes innocence and assures that a conviction will not be secured by inquisitorial
means as on whether the defendant's will was in fact overborne.
Id. See also the discussion concerning "The Shortcomings of the 'Voluntariness' Test" found
in YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES-COMMENTS--QUES-
TIONS 425-28 (7th ed. 1990) (discussing various criticisms of voluntariness test).
44. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298 (1988) (Sixth Amendment); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 244 (1973) (validity of consent to Fourth Amendment search,
while not "waiver," turns on totality of circumstances analysis); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 444, 475-76 (1966) (Fifth Amendment).
45. In his dissenting opinion in a case defining the scope of Sixth Amendment public ac-
cess to suppression hearings, Justice Blackmun noted:
First, the suppression hearing resembles and relates to the full trial in almost
every particular. Evidence is presented by means of live testimony, witnesses are
sworn, and those witnesses are subject to cross-examination. Determination of the
ultimate issue depends in most cases upon the trier of fact's evaluation of the evi-
dence, and credibility is often crucial. Each side has incentive to prevail, with the
result that the role of publicity as a testimonial safeguard, as a mechanism to en-
courage the parties, the witnesses, and the court to a strict conscientiousness in the
performance of their duties, and in providing a means whereby unknown witnesses
may become known, is just as important for the suppression hearing as it is for the
full trial.
Moreover, the pretrial suppression hearing often is critical, and it may be deci-
sive, in the prosecution of a criminal case. If the defendant prevails, he will have
dealt the prosecution's case a serious, perhaps fatal, blow; the proceeding often then
will be dismissed or negotiated on terms favorable to the defense. If the prosecution
successfully resists the motion to suppress, the defendant may have little hope of
success at trial (especially where a confession is in issue), with the result that the
likelihood of a guilty plea is substantially increased.
Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 434 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omit-
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There is a tendency to question the applicability of the Rules of Evi-
dence with an all-or-nothing approach. This perspective fails to account
for the checkerboard approach courts have taken. While occasionally
prosecutors contend that the Rules of Evidence are not applicable at all
to pretrial hearings on motions to suppress,6 courts are nonetheless re-
luctant to jettison the Federal Rules of Evidence in toto.47
One of the key areas of concern is hearsay. Traditionally, hearsay is
admissible at hearings on motions to suppress," making article 8 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence inapplicable. This longstanding practice is
premised on the difference between determining guilt and the more pre-
liminary issue of probable cause.49 Hearsay is usually received in prelim-
inary hearings where the key issue is whether or not there is probable
cause to believe a crime has been committed and this individual commit-
ted it. Similarly, federal grand juries may consider hearsay in determin-
ing probable cause.5" Hearsay is also admissible in forfeiture actions5
ted); see also Paul S. Grobman, Note, The Constitutionality of Statutorily Restricting Public
Access to Judicial Proceedings: The Case of the Rape Shield Mandatory Closure Provision, 66
B.U. L. REv. 271, 288 (1986) (discussing public's right of access to pretrial proceedings).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Brewer, 947 F.2d 404,408 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing supplemen-
tal brief for appellee at 3).
47. See id. at 410.
48. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172-75 (1974). The Court referred to the
Federal Rules of Evidence only for the purpose of analogy. Id. at 172 n.8.
49. Discussing the difference between determining probable cause and guilt, the Court in
Matlock discussed the earlier case of Brinegar v. United States:
It [the Brinegar Court] distinguished between the rules applicable to proceed-
ings to determine probable cause for arrest and search and those governing the crimi-
nal trial itself-"There is a large difference between the two things to be proved, as
well as between the tribunals which determine them, and therefore a like difference in
the quanta and modes of proof required to establish them." That certain evidence
was admitted in preliminary proceedings but excluded at the trial-and the Court
thought both rulings proper-was thought merely to "illustrate the difference in
standards and latitude allowed in passing upon the distinct issues of probable cause
and guilt."
Id. at 173 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173, 174 (i949)) (citations
omitted).
50. FED. R. EvID. 1101(d)(2). An indictment may be based solely on hearsay evidence.
Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 361-64 (1956); see also United States v. Callahan, 442
F. Supp. 1213, 1218 (D. Minn. 1978) (upholding admission of polygraph evidence in grand
jury proceeding when inadmissible at trial), rev'd on other grounds, 596 F.2d 759 (8th Cir.
1979).
The admissibility of hearsay evidence in the grand jury, however, creates an anomaly: an
accused can stand indicted on evidence that would not support a conviction at trial. Presum-
ably, prosecutors would not seek to charge an individual if the charge could not be proven
before a jury. In some instances, however, a prosecutor might be lured into seeking an indict-
ment in the hopes of reaching a plea bargain with the accused before being pressed for proof at
trial.
51. United States v. One 1986 Chevrolet Van, 927 F.2d 39, 41-42 (1st Cir. 1991); United
States v. 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d 725, 728 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461
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where the issue is, once again, one of probable cause. Evidence is not
excluded from grand jury proceedings5 2 or preliminary hearings5 3 be-
cause of constitutional violations; however, the Fourth Amendment ex-
clusionary rule applies to forfeiture proceedings. 4
At least one commentator has suggested that it is the applicability of
hearsay, and not the Rules of Evidence in general, that is at the heart of
Rule 1101:
As we have pointed out in connection with several Rules,
even though Congress has chosen to provide that the Federal
Rules of Evidence should not apply during most preliminary
and post-trial parts of litigation, the fact remains that many of
the Rules will be borrowed and continued in effect during these
proceedings. Most of the Congressional concern was with the
hearsay rule, and it is difficult to imagine that Congress in-
tended that witnesses should testify without taking an oath,
that interpreters should not be provided for non-English speak-
ing persons, and that proper objections should not be made to
offers of evidence in proceedings other than trials on the merits.
The decisions to date indicate that Rule 1101 is primarily a re-
striction on the application of the hearsay rule."5
It is appropriate to admit hearsay at hearings on motions to suppress
given the nature of the matter to be adjudicated.
In the Fourth Amendment area, the very basis of probable cause is
hearsay. 6 If hearsay were inadmissible, the hearing on the motion to
suppress would require most, if not all, of the trial witnesses to appear at
the hearing. This would increase the cost of holding such hearings signif-
icantly, since a greater number of witnesses would have to be called;
U.S. 914 (1983); Ted's Motors v. United States, 217 F.2d 777, 780 (8th Cir. 1954); United
States v. $87,279, 546 F. Supp. 1120, 1126 (S.D. Ga. 1982).
52. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-52 (1974).
53. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348; Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 483 (1958);
United States v. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d 54, 66-67 (1981).
54. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 696-702 (1965).
55. SALTZBURG & MARTIN, supra note 35, at 565 (emphasis added).
56. Police may rely on hearsay to constitute probable cause if there is some corroborating
evidence gathered by the arresting officers. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 567 (1971).
Hearsay is also permissible as grounds to establish reasonable suspicion. United States v.
Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1270 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 916 (1983).
Since the police may rely on hearsay, even the hearsay of an anonymous but reliable
informant ... as the basis for reasonable suspicion to make a stop, they should also
be permitted to offer that same hearsay as testimony to support their reasonable sus-
picion when a defendant moves to suppress evidence on the ground that reasonable
suspicion did not exist.
Id. (citation omitted).
[Vol. 25:987
CRIMINAL SUPPRESSION HEARINGS
more testimony would have to be adduced; and more court, attorney and
staff time would be used. Another result might be that courts would be
tempted to stretch the hearsay exceptions in the hearing context in an
effort to allow more evidence in using fewer witnesses and thus decrease
the burdens of conducting the hearing. Moreover, there is a great deal of
hearsay information on which police rely on a daily basis that could no
longer be used if admissibility at a later hearing was in doubt. For exam-
ple, police reports are sometimes excluded as hearsay at a criminal
trial,57 yet they are by definition a key source of information for law en-
forcement officers. To exclude these at hearings on motions to suppress
would greatly hamper law enforcement and might impede defense con-
cerns as well. The concerns are similar in the other categories of sup-
pression hearings.
Yet hearsay is excluded at trial precisely because it is unreliable.58
Thus, in cases permitting hearsay because the Federal Rules of Evidence
are not applicable under Rule 1101, a defendant must be given an oppor-
tunity to challenge the reliability of disputed evidence. 59 Reliance on
hearsay as inflexibly conclusive evidence has been found to be impermis-
sible. ° This same tension between the need to rely on hearsay and the
skepticism about its reliability is found in the Fourth Amendment area:
although there is a presumption that information supplied in an affidavit
to support a warrant is true, a defendant may challenge the truthfulness
in a motion to suppress if a substantial showing is made that the state-
57. See FED. R. EvID. 803(6), (8). Police reports have run afoul of the duty to record
requirement of the business record exception. Johnson v. Lutz, 170 N.E. 517, 518 (N.Y. 1930)
(stating informant has no duty to report, so police report relying on informant inadmissible);
see also FED. R. EvID. 803(6) advisory committee's note (stating supplier of information must
have duty to report; information supplied by bystander does not qualify). Moreover, Rule
803(8) precludes the use of public records in criminal matters unless they are offered against
the Government. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(B), (C). Even then, there may be problems with
admissibility if the report is excludable under 803(6). United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 78
(2d Cir. 1977) (reports excluded under 803(8)(B), (C) never admissible as business records).
58. CLEARY, supra note 3, § 245, at 728-29.
59. See, eg., United States v. Agyemang, 876 F.2d 1264, 1271-72 (7th Cir. 1989):
Some tension does exist between the more lax evidentiary standards at sentencing-
including allowing hearsay-and a defendant's right not to be sentenced based on
inaccurate information .... This court has resolved that tension by insisting that a
defendant have a reasonable opportunity to rebut contested hearsay and that the
contested hearsay be reliable .... [W]e do not mean that the hearsay must fit into
some recognized hearsay exception or that the government must prove the hearsay is
true beyond a reasonable doubt; rather, the sentencing judge must be satisfied, in
light of all the circumstances that the hearsay is worthy of credence.
Id.
60. Downie v. Klincar, 759 F. Supp. 425, 428-29 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (challenging policies and
practices of parole board on issue of whether board, at final revocation hearing, is entitled to
rely on eyewitness police reports as conclusive evidence).
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ments were knowingly and intentionally false, or made with a reckless
disregard for the truth.6 Thus, while hearsay may be used, it is not im-
mune from challenge.
What about the other Rules of Evidence? Must evidence always be
relevant?62 If the Rules are truly inapplicable, as Rule 1101 suggests,
irrelevant evidence could abound. Of course, as a practical matter,
judges would not waste time with such evidence in the majority of cases,
but nothing would prevent its admission.
Must witnesses always be sworn?63 Again, if the Rules are truly
inapplicable, as Rule 1101 suggests, there would be no requirement that a
witness be sworn. Yet an oath or affirmation is required by every witness
in suppression hearings and no one objects to this requirement. In fact, it
is usually to the advantage of the parties to have the oath administered in
the event that the testimony must be used for another purpose later on.' 4
Similarly, a witness could testify without being competent 65 or without
personal knowledge,6 6 yet few courts would waste much time on such
evidence.
A more troublesome question arises, however, when we consider the
concerns of impeachment,67 sequestration, 68 cross-examination 69 and
confrontation.7 ° At trial these are a matter of right. At a hearing they
61. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978).
62. See FED. R. EVID. 401-412.
63. FED. R. EVID. 603.
64. For example, prior recorded testimony is admissible if a witness is unavailable at trial.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). Prior inconsistent statements are admissible as substantive evidence
only if made under oath. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
65. FED. R. EVID. 601.
66. See FED. R. EVID. 602.
67. FED. R. EVID. 607-610.
68. FED. R. EVID. 615.
69. FED. R. EVID. 611; see Delaware v. VanArsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986).
70. See, eg., White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992) (rejecting argument that declarant
must be produced or shown to be available before hearsay statements would be admitted at
trial under "firmly rooted" hearsay exception(s)); Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990)
(finding Confrontation Clause does not prohibit child witness from testifying via closed circuit
television); Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990) (noting hearsay statements of child victim
lacked particularized guarantees of trustworthiness required for admission under Confronta-
tion Clause); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) (finding that procedure for placing screen
between testifying complaining witness and dependant at trial violated right of confrontation
in absence of individualized findings that child witnesses needed special protection); Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (noting testimony of witness at preliminary hearing admissible at
trial where there was opportunity for cross-examination and witness is unavailable); Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (finding that despite state policy protecting identity of juvenile
offenders, refusal of right to cross-examine is violation of Sixth Amendment rights); California
v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (stating prior inconsistent statement admissible if witness af-
forded opportunity to explain); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (finding testimony of
[Vol. 25:9871000
CRIMINAL SUPPRESSION HEARINGS
are not guaranteed. There is an inherent sense of fair play that if a wit-
ness testifies under oath, the other side should have the right to cross-
examine and attempt to impeach that person, but the scope of these ef-
forts in a hearing may be greatly curtailed, subject to the judge's discre-
tion. The Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, so crucial at trial, is
not applicable in a hearing on a motion to suppress." Thus, criminal
defendants are dependent upon court discretion to define the scope of
allowable confrontation, if any. Courts rarely issue opinions on these
topics. Courts have held, however, that notwithstanding Rule 1101 Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 615 requiring the sequestration of witnesses at the
request of a party applies in hearings on motions to suppress.
72
Are these evidentiary standards for motions to suppress, such as
they are, appropriate? This depends, in part, upon the perspective of
who is asking the question and what it is that we seek to accomplish in
hearings on motions to suppress.
III. THE ALTERNATIVE PURPOSES OF THE HEARING ON A MOTION
TO SUPPRESS: WHAT DOES IT MATTER, ANYWAY, AFTER
THE HEARING ON THE MOTION IS OVER?
It is axiomatic that different parties to litigation will have different
perspectives on the importance of the evidentiary rules. Litigators have
sometimes seen the Federal Rules of Evidence as a troublesome obstacle
course of impediments to admissibility. These hurdles to admissibility,
however, can often be circumvented if one is but creative and dogged
enough. Thus, the Federal Rules of Evidence matter, but they matter
more for the symbolic values represented than for the ultimate outcome
of any objection as to admissibility. In short, the Rules try to keep liti-
gators honest; their aim is not necessarily to create insurmountable barri-
ers to the presentation of evidence, but rather to ensure that the lawyer is
witness at preliminary hearing inadmissible when state makes no effort to obtain witness's
presence at trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 40 (1965) (noting testimony from preliminary
hearing inadmissible at trial where defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine).
71. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 310-12 (1967) (holding Sixth Amendment did not
compel disclosure of informant's identity at hearing on motion to suppress) (distinguishing
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957)).
72. United States v. Brewer, 947 F.2d 404, 410 (9th Cir. 1991) (Rule 615 ap-p iicable to
evidentiary hearing conducted to resolve factual issues presented in motion to suppress evi-
dence pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has also found Federal Rule of Evidence 615 applic-
able to hearings on motions to suppress. Sitting en banc, the court agreed with the three-judge
panel's opinion that found error in the hearing judge's refusal to exclude government witnesses
from a suppression hearing but held the error harmless. United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d
1058, 1076 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 434 U.S. 1016 (1978).
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offering evidence for the right reason and at the right time. Judges may
perceive the Rules not only as positive guideposts, but as pitfalls in the
appellate process. Thus, judges may tend to obscure the reasons for their
rulings to protect the record. Litigants may view the Rules as mere tech-
nicalities that mystify the process and increase the power of the judges
and lawyers.
The relaxed evidentiary standards at the hearing on any motion to
suppress ease the determination of the underlying issues. In addition,
however, they further the often unspoken secondary goal of the hearing:
if a defense counsel succeeds in obtaining a hearing on a motion to sup-
press, it provides an excellent discovery device regardless of the final out-
come. In addition, the defense counsel is given an opportunity to hear at
least one crucial law enforcement witness to the case and develop an en-
tire transcript that may provide fodder for impeachment by a prior in-
consistent statement at trial. Occasionally, a civilian witness may be
called to testify in a hearing on a motion to suppress, especially when the
defendant challenges identification testimony as tainted.
The relaxed evidentiary standard may also encourage the defendant
to testify in an effort to suppress evidence. This would be especially true
in attempts to suppress statements made by a defendant. Who better to
discuss the validity of a Miranda or Sixth Amendment waiver? Who
better to discuss the individualized factors making a confession involun-
tary? In one respect, this can be seen as empowering a criminal defend-
ant, permitting input into the decision-making process. From another
viewpoint, however, the hearing becomes a discovery device for the pros-
ecution as well, previewing possible defense trial theories and providing
material for impeachment should the defendant testify at trial.
If a defendant testifies at the hearing, the prosecution may not intro-
duce the testimony against him or her at trial to establish guilt.73 How-
ever, the testimony adduced at the hearing may be used to impeach the
defendant should he or she choose to testify at trial. This is consistent
with the line of cases permitting the defendant to be impeached with
unconstitutionally obtained evidence.74
A problem arises, however, when the witness, especially the criminal
defenda, A- testifies at a hearing conducted under relaxed evidentiary
73. Thus, the early concern expressed in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 262 (1960),
that testifying at the hearing on the motion to suppress placed the defendant on the "horn[s] of
[a] dilemma" was alleviated, at least in theory, by the holding in Simmons v. United States,
390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968), that the hearing testimony could not be used to establish guilt at
trial.
74. The impeachment exception to the constitutional exclusionary rules is relatively broad.
United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980) (stating impeachment exception provides
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rules. Evidence not ordinarily admissible at trial may now be admissible
to impeach. Thus, hearing judges should keep this potential future use at
trial in mind and restrain at least the most egregious hearsay offered at
the hearing.
IV. ADJUDICATING CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS IN A HEARING ON A
MOTION TO SUPPRESS-Is IT MERELY AN EVIDENTIARY
RULING?
As a teacher of both evidence and criminal procedure, it is easy to
perceive a conflict of viewpoints in the general outlooks toward the two
subject matters. In evidence class, the sense of the Federal Rules is to
create a "bias towards admissibility."75 In criminal procedure, however,
evidence is excluded to further constitutional policy goals that may have
nothing to do with the reliability of the evidence in question. These con-
stitutional concerns go far beyond the merely procedural and touch upon
the substantive concerns at trial. Thus, constitutional policy reasons
eclipse purely evidentiary rules. The importance of evidentiary law bears
an inverse relationship to the complexity of related questions of admissi-
bility under criminal procedure doctrines. Constitutional doctrines,
however, are not given equal weight by the courts in deciding admissibil-
ity. Those concerns that bear on the reliability of the evidence are more
that when direct testimony suggests questions to reasonably competent cross-examiner, wit-
ness's answers may be impeached with "tainted" evidence).
The seminal ease is Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), which permitted the
government to impeach the defendant with real evidence (heroin) seized illegally from his
possession at the time of an earlier, unrelated arrest after the defendant "opened the door" at
trial by denying that he had ever dealt in or possessed drugs. Id. at 65. Since then, the
Supreme Court has permitted the prosecution to impeach a criminal defendant with state-
ments taken in violation of Miranda rights, Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971),
even when the defendant asserted his or her right to an attorney under Miranda. Oregon v.
Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723 (1975); see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Impeachment by means of statements taken in violation of Sixth Amendment rights has
been prohibited, however. United States v. Brown, 699 F.2d 585, 590-91 (2d Cir. 1983). Nor
may the prosecution impeach a criminal defendant by means of statements that were coerced
in violation of due process. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979); Mincey v. Ari-
zona, 437 U.S. 385, 401-02 (1978); see also Christopher Harkins, Note, The Pinocchio Defense
Witness Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Combatting a Defendant's Right to
Use with Impunity the Perurious Testimony of Defense Witnesses, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 375
(arguing for expansion of defendant impeachment exception to exclusionary rule to permit
introduction of defendant's suppressed evidence to impeach defense witnesses testifying perju-
riously for purpose of exculpating defendant).
75. Leonard, supra note 41, at 956, and authorities cited therein. "First, courts and
codifiers have come to believe that truth is likely to emerge when more, rather than less, evi-
dence is heard by the trier of fact. This has led to a decided bias toward admissibility rather
than exclusion and the abrogation of many per se exclusionary rules." Id. (citations omitted).
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likely to lead to exclusion than those that do not.76
Evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is usually
extremely reliable evidence of a crime, such as physical evidence that is
itself contraband or that indicates guilt.7 7 From a purely procedural evi-
dentiary viewpoint, such evidence should be allowed at trial. At com-
mon law courts did not inquire as to the source of evidence, unless its
reliability was in question.78 We have a strong tradition of admitting
probative evidence when possible and excluding it only if there are very
strong policy reasons. The constitutional doctrines giving rise to the ex-
76. See the discussion of the hierarchy of rights contained in Professor Whitebread's arti-
cle, Charles H. Whitebread, The Burger Court's Counter-Revolution in Criminal Procedure:
The Recent Criminal Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 471,
478-84 (1985). Professor Whitebread suggests that of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights applicable before trial, the Court places the Sixth Amendment, the amendment that
most closely guards the reliability of evidence, at the top of the hierarchy; followed by the Fifth
Amendment in the middle, again with a heavy emphasis on the reliability of evidence, be it
confessions or identification testimony; and the Fourth Amendment at the bottom. The more
the reliability of the evidence in question may be affected, the more the Court is willing to
apply the exclusionary sanction. Id.
Professor Stacy suggests that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have cited "the impor-
tance of accurate adjudication as a reason to interpret restrictively rights that can be called
'truth-impairing,' that is rights withholding relevant evidence of guilt from the adjudicative
process," but that the age-old concern that we avoid mistaken guilt verdicts has been replaced
by a concern to avoid overall errors. Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1369, 1369 (1991).
77. Thus, hostility toward the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is common. See
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 410 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (referring to exclusion-
ary rule as "the much-criticized course of punishing the public for mistakes and misdeeds of
law enforcement officers, instead of punishing the officers directly .... It mechanically and
blindly keeps reliable evidence from juries whether the claimed constitutional violation in-
volves gross police misconduct or honest human error."); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496
(1976) (Burger, CJ., concurring) ("The exclusionary rule has been operative long enough to
demonstrate its flaws .... Its function is simply the exclusion of truths from the factfinding
process."); id. at 538 (White, J., dissenting) ("The [exclusionary] rule has been much criticized
and suggestions have been made that it should be wholly abolished [as senseless obstacle to
truth in criminal trials]."); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 420 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (characterizing suppression doctrine as anomalous and ineffective
mechanism to regulate law enforcement); see STEVEN R. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY IN-
JUSTICE: THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE 62 (1977); Raymond G. Hall,
The Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 3 CRIM. JUST. J. 303, 307-08 (1980) (emphasizing
changing nature of criminal trials from determination of defendant's culpability to analysis of
police error); Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Develop-
ment and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1365, 1393 (1983) (addressing four legitimate criticisms of exclusionary rule, including most
prominent that rule deprives courts of reliable evidence resulting in freeing guilty persons).
78. Prior to the adoption of a federal Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule in Weeks,
competent evidence would be admitted at trial without inquiry into the manner by which it
was obtained. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 396 (1914); see also 8 JOHN H. WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2183, at 6-7 (McNaughton rev. 1940) (ar-
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clusionary rules provide such reasons. For substantive reasons of deter-
rence,79 judicial integrity, 0 due process8 ' and practical considerations, 2
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule may keep the reliable evidence
from the fact finder.
When we survey other constitutional exclusionary rules, a further
concern arises: the trustworthiness of the evidence. One reason for ex-
cluding an involuntary confession is that we distrust its reliability.
The first rules governing the admissibility of confessions were
laid down in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a time
when illegal police methods were relevant only insofar as they
affected the trustworthiness of the evidence. Whatever the
meaning of the elusive terms "involuntary" and "coerced" con-
fessions since 1940, for centuries the rule that a confession was
admissible so long as it was "voluntary" was more or less an
alternative statement of the rule that a confession was admissi-
ble so long as it was free of influence which made it untrust-
worthy or "probably untrue."8 3
Thus when the courts exclude statements as involuntary, one value they
further is the goal of basing verdicts on reliable evidence. In Miranda v.
Arizona 14 the Court was willing to assume the presence of an inherently
guing exclusionary rule improper punishment for violation of law without proper procedure of
determining culpability for that violation).
This is not to say, however, that the common law would not exclude evidence if it had
some prejudicial impact:
The prejudice rule has ancient roots. Thayer traced its origins back to the thirteenth
century, although trials at that time had neither witness testimony nor formal rules
of evidence as we know them. Certainly by the late 1600's, a rule was in place per-
mitting the exclusion of relevant evidence likely to confuse the jury, unfairly surprise
the opponent who might not be prepared to respond, delay the trial, or arouse the
passions of jurors.
Tanford, supra note 1, at 834.
79. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961). Deterrence is the key, if not the only ration-
ale, for the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule now recognized by the Court. Marsh, supra
note 21, at 955-61.
80. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659; see also Keith C. Monroe, The Imperative of Judicial Integrity
and the Exclusionary Rule, 4 W. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 2 (1976) (judicial integrity view essentially
applies equitable "clean hands" doctrine to criminal law); Fred G. Bennett, Comment, Judicial
Integrity and Judicial Review: An Argument for Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule,
20 UCLA L. REv. 1129, 1133-64 (1973) (emphasizing importance of judicial integrity as ra-
tionale for exclusionary rule).
81. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655-56.
82. Id. at 657.
83. CLEARY, supra note 3, § 226, at 114; KAMISAR et al., supra note 43, at 422 (citing
generally EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 147 (Edward W. Cleary ed.,
3d ed. 1984)); 3 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 822, at 329-36 (Chadbourne rev. 1940)).
84. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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coercive atmosphere whenever a suspect underwent custodial interroga-
tion. This potential coercion necessarily called into question the reliabil-
ity of any statements made by the defendant in the absence of Miranda
warnings or an effective waiver of Miranda rights.85 When identification
testimony is considered, constitutional error goes to the heart of reliabil-
ity and reliability is the guiding factor governing admissibility. 6 When
Sixth Amendment concerns are considered-either for questions con-
cerning confessions or eyewitness identification-notions of fair play and
due process are also at issue. The presence of an attorney can help en-
sure that the defense counsel can accurately reconstruct the identification
procedure at a hearing and at trial. 7 In addition, the presence of an
attorney can provide an accused with a strong shield against government
interrogation as well as a professional assessment of the case before ad-
vising the client to communicate with police.88
Is it appropriate to have a differentiated standard for the admissibil-
ity of evidence premised on a "hierarchy" of rights? It is unlikely that
the founders considered one portion of the Bill of Rights more important
than another. If nothing else, however, the more courts are concerned
with constitutional questions-wherever they are in the "hierarchy"-
the less attention they pay to procedural evidentiary rules. Thus, the
importance of evidence law bears an inverse proportion to the complexity
of any related questions of admissibility of evidence under doctrines
other than the rules of evidence.
V. ONCE THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE Is DETERMINED IN A
HEARING ON A MOTION TO SUPPRESS, MAY JURIES
RECONSIDER THE CLAIM?
Once a defendant loses a hearing on a motion to suppress, may the
constitutional issues surrounding the admissibility of the evidence be re-
presented to and re-argued before the jury, allowing them to re-decide
the admissibility question during the guilt adjudication phase? Were the
issue simply a procedural evidentiary question, the answer would be no.
Yet, suppression issues are often presented and argued before juries, even
though the arguments may take on a different emphasis than those focus-
ing solely on guilt or innocence.
85. Id. at 445-58, 478-79. Arguably this assertion is weakened by the Rehnquist Court's
characterization of Miranda as merely a prophylactic rule. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649, 653 (1984).
86. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196-201 (1972).
87. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-38, 241 (1967).
88. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 308-10 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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If the question is about the voluntariness of a confession, the defend-
ant must be afforded an opportunity to present evidence concerning the
details surrounding the giving of the confession. 9 Similarly, the question
of whether Miranda rights were given and the validity of any waiver of
those rights is presented and argued to a jury. Defense counsel would be
remiss in failing to argue about the reliability of eyewitness testimony.
Even Fourth Amendment claims are presented de facto to the jury after
the suppression hearings have been resolved. As Professor Dershowitz
has written:
Several of my clients have gone free because their constitutional
rights were violated by agents of the government. In represent-
ing criminal defendants-especially guilty ones-it is often nec-
essary to take the offensive against the government: to put the
government on trial for its misconduct. In law, as in sports, the
best defense is a good offense.90
Later, he adds: "When a criminal lawyer represents a guilty defendant-
and the vast majority of criminal defendants are guilty-his only realistic
alternative may sometimes be to put the government on trial. The Amer-
ican legal system is unique in permitting this turnabout."9 1 Thus, in each
situation the defendant gets a second chance to attempt to convince the
fact finder to disregard the evidence in question on the basis of its relia-
bility or the repugnancy of police conduct. This reflects, once again, that
in criminal litigation the evidentiary procedural rules will take a back
seat to the constitutional concerns.
VI. CONCLUSION
The evidentiary rules are important in hearings on motions to sup-
press, even though the Federal Rules of Evidence seem to exclude such
hearings from the operation of the Rules. But their importance is
eclipsed by the constitutional doctrines that they serve. Thus, courts
should take care to identify the underlying rationale of the constitutional
exclusionary rules and seek to effectuate them, even at the cost of the
evidentiary principles.
89. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689-91 (1986).
90. ALAN DERSHOWlTZ, THE BEST DEFENSE at xiv (1982).
91. Id. at 43.
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